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The need to test the reliability of potential partners at the beginning of a
project is a feature typical of many human relationships, not only those of
an economic nature. This need is particularly strong in the frequent cases
in which, once the project starts, a separation from unreliable partners be-
comes more difficult. It is therefore not surprising that many partnerships
feature, either explicitly or implicitly, an initial period of “probation” in
which the persons involved monitor each other and decide, before it is “too
late”, whether to go on with the relationship. What is perhaps more surpris-
ing is that monitoring partners permanently during these probation periods
may not be optimal, and in this paper we want to show why.
The intuition is simple. Consider an engagement before marriage in which
the woman wants to test the loyalty of the potential husband (or vice versa
if you prefer). A simplification not too far from reality is to assume that
there are two types of men: those who will never betray their partner and
those who instead might fall to the temptation of a love affair if an attractive
occasion materializes. In order to find out which type of men the potential
husband is, the fiancee might try to spend as much time as possible with him,
monitoring him closely in all his daily and night activities. In this way she
would apparently learn a lot about him, but effectively she would not learn
the most important thing to be learned, which is how the potential husband
behaves when, as during marriage, he is not monitored continuously. Only by
giving the partner the possibility to mis-behave might he be tempted to do
it, and only in this case could his type possibly be revealed when separating
would still be feasible at low cost.
A similar situation characterizes labor market contracts where probation-
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ary periods are often specified explicitly. Note that the distinctive feature of
these periods is not to make monitoring possible, but to be periods in which
allow firing at a relatively low cost. Even when probation is not explicitly
foreseen in a contract, various reasons (e.g. sunk costs or investments in
job specific human capital) make it easier to fire a worker earlier in a ca-
reer rather than later. In all these cases we argue that too much monitoring
at the beginning of the relationship is not optimal because it prevents the
firm from learning how the worker behaves when she is not monitored. As
in the case of the engagement before marriage, the firm is typically inter-
ested in discriminating between two types of potential employees: those who
are “unconditional cooperators” and who therefore exert a maximum level
of effort in all instances and those who are instead “rational shirkers” and
who would therefore indulge in laziness if the cost of effort is high and the
probability of detection sufficiently low.1 Inasmuch as the “rational shirkers”
can mimic the behavior of the “unconditional cooperators” during probation,
continuous monitoring (“keeping the office door always open”) is suboptimal
because the probability of detection would be too high and the “rational
shirker” would never concede to the temptation of being “lazy”. As a result
the two types of workers would be observationally identical during probation,
and only when firing becomes costly would the true types be revealed. On
the contrary, random monitoring (“opening the door not too often and with
no specific pattern”) might be more revealing because the “rational shirker”
1The distinction between those two types of agents is consistent with findings in a
recent empirical literature: For example, Nagin et al (2002) analyze data from a field
experiment in which the monitoring rate is varied to see how individuals react to it in
terms of shirking. They find that although there are many “rational shirkers”, a significant
proportion of agents does not take advantage when the monitoring rate goes down and can
thus be classified as “unconditional cooperators”. In a similar vein, Ichino and Riphahn
(2005) compare the absenteeism rate of newly hired workers during and after probation
in a large Italian bank; 42% of them are never absent while among the others an increase
in absenteeism is observed on average when incentives change at the end of probation.
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would be induced to take a chance to be lazy. Thus, only in this case would
there be a chance that the two types of workers might be caught behaving
differently.2
Also in the case of trading between firms, and in general between “buy-
ers” and “sellers”, the same type of result might apply. Most firms write
long-term contracts with other firms to obtain inputs for their production
process. The selection of partners for the provision of inputs may be subject
to a trial period similar to the one that characterizes labor or marriage con-
tracts. What this paper suggests is that these periods would be totally unin-
formative about the reliability of the trading partners if the buyer announced
his willingness to monitor extensively the quality of the input acquired dur-
ing trial. If the unreliable sellers knew that they would be fully monitored
during trial, they would try to make their product indistinguishable from the
product of reliable sellers. However, this would offer no guarantee that the
product would be of high quality after the long-term contract is signed.
Note that our argument apply not only to long-term relationships but is
also relevant for one-shot interactions in which the reliability of a partner is
so important that it becomes crucial to test it before the main interaction
starts, in order to screen out “bad types” from “good types”.
There is an interesting link between the mechanism highlighted in our pa-
per and the recent growing literature on how economic incentives may “crowd
out” intrinsic motivation.3 In this line of research, as well as in our paper, a
2A framework in which it is unclear ex ante whether the right partner is chosen is also
analyzed in Watson (1999), (2002). As in our paper, some of the potential partners are
cooperators, while others are more opportunistic and would cheat whenever they find it
profitable to do so. In equilibrium, interaction starts with small stakes only, while stakes
are increasing over time as more information about the partner is revealed. Contrary to
our paper, the role of monitoring is not considered, and therefore these models suggest an
alternative channel (“gradualism”) through which large losses from doing business with
the wrong partner can be avoided.
3This literature is surveyed, among others, in Frey and Jegen (2001), Gneezy (2004),
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principal’s use of monitoring and control to create effort incentives may be
counterproductive. The literature has identified adverse effects of monitor-
ing “good types” whose intrinsic motivation may be reduced by the feeling
that the principal does not trust them, believing that explicit incentives are
necessary to induce an effort that they would have been happy to exert in
any case. Our paper, instead, focuses on the negative effect of monitoring on
opportunistic “bad types” who are induced to mimic “good types”, which in
turn hinders their detection.
In order to focus on the specific intuition that motivates our paper, we
abstract from crowding-out aspects and assume that “good types” are indif-
ferent to monitoring and control. Under this assumption, we analyze formally
in Section 2 under what conditions principals can expect to be successful in
filtering out unreliable partners during probation and what are the poten-
tial gains from setting the monitoring intensity optimally. Section 3 will
relate and contrast our claim with other possible theories of the relationship
between monitoring and productivity, including the above-mentioned litera-
ture on crowding-out. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix
available on the JEBO website.
2 The model
2.1 Basic setup
We consider one principal facing N ≥ 1 agents in a relationship lasting at
most two periods i = 1, 2. Period 1 is a probation period while period 2 is
the time after probation. In each period, agents can choose an action from
{E, S} where E and S denote “exerting effort” and “shirking”, respectively.
and Falk and Kosfeld (2006); see also our discussion in section 3.4.
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A shirking agent produces 0 output, while, when exerting effort, each agent
produces vi in period i. We have in mind situations in which the output of
an agent’s effort in period 1 is negligible compared to period 2, and thus we
assume v1 = 0 and v2 > 0.
4 We interpret v2 as a Net Present Value, thereby
allowing period 2 to be of any length relative to the probation period. In
particular, period 2 could last for some time so that v2 would reflect the
overall discounted output in a long-term relationship, or period 2 could be
short, indicating, for example, that the principal benefits from the effort of
the agent only at a single (but maybe particularly important) occasion.
Although all agents are equally valuable to the principal when exerting
effort, they differ with respect to the (privately known) cost of doing so,
which is represented by a parameter θ ∈ {G,B}: “bad types”, denoted by
B, have effort costs ci in period i, where c1 = c, c2 = k · c with k > 0, and
where c is drawn from an atomless distribution H(c) ∈ C2 with support [0,1]
at the beginning of the game.5 The parameter k is simply a proportionality
factor that allows for appropriately adjusting and discounting effort costs
with respect to the length of p riod 2 relative to period 1. Furthermore,
k might also reflect potential differences in the intensity of effort required
during and after probation. On the other hand “good types”, denoted by
G, do not face any costs of exerting effort.6 In the population of agents,
the shares of good and bad types are α and (1 − α), respectively, where
0 < α < 1. Concerning the informational environment, we assume that each
agent privately learns his type at the beginning of the game and that α and
4Assuming v1 > 0 instead would not affect our results qualitatively; see section 3.1.
5Our approach is isomorphic to a model with a continuum of types (cost realizations),
where the type distribution has an atom at 0.
6As explained in the Introduction, this view is for example broadly confirmed in a field
experiment reported in Nagin et al (2002). Alternatively, we could assume that good types
face effort costs that are lower on average than those of bad types. This would not change
our arguments qualitatively.
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H(·) are common knowledge.
Period 1 is a probation period in which the principal can monitor each
agent at no cost.7 His choice variable is thus a monitoring frequency q ∈
[0, 1]. The outcome of the monitoring process is captured by a variable
M ∈ {E, S, 0} where M = E and M = S perfectly reveal whether or not
shirking has occurred, while M = 0 denotes the case where an agent has
not been monitored. In line with most of the literature, we assume that the
principal is able to commit to her chosen monitoring rate.8
After observing the outcome of the monitoring process and updating his
beliefs appropriately by use of Bayes’ rule, the principal makes a firing deci-
sion F ∈ {0, 1}, where F = 1 means that an agent is fired. Firing costs in the
trial period are zero, while in the second period they are prohibitively high.9
It is assumed that the population out of which the N agents are drawn is
sufficiently large such that, upon monitoring one agent, no inference can be
made about the pool composition of the remaining N − 1 agents.
As for payments, we denote by ti the transfer from the principal to each
7Note that the mere objective of filtering out bad agents will be sufficient for our anal-
ysis, and assuming costless monitoring makes our point particularly striking. Therefore,
our results are qualitatively different from the literature on law enforcement building on
Becker (1968) where optimal detection probabilities are typically less than one due to
convex enforcement cost functions (see also Besanko and Spulber (1989) and Polinsky and
Shavell (2000)).
8Exceptions include Khalil (1997) and Khalil and Lawarree (2001) where the principal
decides on her monitoring policy ex post, after agents have chosen their actions. As will
become clear below, in our model, the principal would benefit from the ability to increase
the monitoring rate ex post. However, from an ex ante point of view she would be better
off with commitment, so credibility is an important issue for the principal to overcome this
problem of time inconsistency. For example, one possibility to achieve this would be to
commit only a limited amount of resources to the monitoring technology so that it would
be technically unfeasible to monitor all agents at a higher rate than the announced one.
9All we need is that splitting becomes more costly for the principal as the length of the
relationship increases, which is often the case in reality. For example, in many countries
employment protection is increasing in tenure with the firm, such that the principal is
interested in identifying bad agents as early as possible, in order not to remain stuck with
them when firing becomes too expensive or virtually impossible. The same is true in
situations of match-specific human-capital investments at the beginning of a relationship.
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agent. During probation, the transfer t1 could in principle be set equal to
zero, although in most situations it would be natural to imagine that some
kind of “show-up fee” t1 > 0 is paid to the worker independently of the
probation outcome. In the case of period 2, if the worker is hired at the
end of probation, he cannot be fired later in the sense that he is in any case
entitled to a transfer t2 > t1 independently of his performance. We also make
the following assumption:
Assumption 1. v2 > t2 ≥ 1,
which implies that the payoff for the principal from each agent who exerts
effort in period 2 is positive (v2 > t2). Furthermore, as explained below,
t2 ≥ 1 implies that in period 1, exerting effort is privately optimal for a bad
agent for any value of c when he is monitored with certainty.
Given Assumption 1, and coming back to the firing decision, we want
the principal to wish to continue with an agent when his belief after the
monitoring process is greater or equal to the prior α.10 This will imply that
the following assumption must hold:
Assumption 2. α · (v2 − t2) + (1− α) · (−t2) > 0.
Summarizing, the game has the following stages:
• At stage 0, each agent’s type is determined by a nature’s move and is
only known to the agent.
• At stage 1, the principal sets and commits to a monitoring probability
q for the probation period.
10We can alternatively assume that an agent cannot be fired without being monitored.
This would for example be consistent with unjust-dismissal legislation in the US; see
Krueger (1991).
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• At stage 2, period 1 begins and each agent independently decides on
whether or not to exert effort. After the effort choice is made, each
agent is monitored with probability q.
• At stage 3, given the outcome of the monitoring procedure, the princi-
pal decides on which agents to fire. After the firing decision period 1
ends.
• At stage 4, in period 2, all remaining agents again decide on whether
or not to exert effort. Then the game ends.
2.2 Equilibrium analysis
2.2.1 Effort choice in period 2
Let us start the analysis of the game at stage 4, and denote by aθi ∈ {E, S} the
action chosen by type θ ∈ {B,G} in period i = 1, 2. Equilibrium values carry
an asterisk ∗. We start with a good type. Since he has no effort costs, he is
indifferent between exerting effort an shirking (both actions yield a payoff of
t2). Throughout we assume that both types exert effort when indifferent, so
that good types will always choose aG∗2 = E in period 2.
11 Contrary to that,
in period 2, a bad type gets (t2−k · c) from choosing E and t2 from choosing
S, so bad types will always shirk in period 2 (i.e. aB∗2 (c) ≡ S ∀c > 0).
2.2.2 Firing decision
Let us now look at the principal’s optimal firing decision at stage 3 after
monitoring has been carried out. Denote by β ∈ [0, 1] the belief of facing a
good type conditional on the outcome of the monitoring process:
βM := Pr(θ = G |M) ∀M = E, S, 0 (1)
11It suffices to assume that the expected payoff for the principal in period 2 from having
a good (bad) type is positive (negative).
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Of course, β0 = α, and in (a Bayesian perfect) equilibrium, whenever possi-
ble, beliefs have to be consistently derived using Bayes’ rule from the equi-
librium strategies of each type of agent at stage 2 (see e.g. Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991). Given that good types will exert effort while bad types will
always shirk in period 2, the principal’s expected payoff from an agent for
period 2 as a function of β is given by
β(v2 − t2) + (1− β)(−t2), (2)
which may be positive or negative. It follows that the principal will fire an
agent, whenever monitoring “delivers” a belief for this agent to be a good
type that is sufficiently low:
F ∗(β) =
{




2.2.3 Effort choice in period 1
Now consider the optimal effort decision at stage 2 by each type for a given
probability of monitoring q. In doing so, we directly look at the following
equilibrium continuation and then see how it can be supported.
Lemma 1. At stage 2, for all q < q := 1
t2
, there exists an equilibrium
continuation in which
a) each good type chooses aG∗1 = E independent of q,
b) each bad types shirks whenever his realization of c is sufficiently high. This
happens with probability (1− e(q)) > 0,12
c) the principal’s beliefs after monitoring has been carried out are given by
β∗E =
α
α+ (1− α)e(q) > α (4)
β∗S = 0, (5)
12The exact definition of e(q) is given in Eqn. 9 below.
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and she optimally fires all agents for whom M = S holds and keeps all other
agents (including those who have not been monitored).
For an intuition for Lemma 1, let us start with a good type. On the
equilibrium path, when choosing E, he gets t1 in period 1 and t2 in period
2; if he is monitored, this will lead to M = E, so the principal holds the
belief β∗E =
α
α+(1−α)e(q) > α for which, by Assumption 2, F = 0 is optimal.
If he is not monitored, the principal holds belief β∗ = α, and he is not fired
either. On the other hand, when choosing S in the first period, his payoff
is still t1 since he does not save in effort costs, but with probability q, he is
monitored, found to be shirking and, given belief β∗S = 0, fired. It follows
that his expected payoff for period 2 is only (1− q)t2 and, thus, a deviation
is never profitable.
Now consider a bad type. When choosing E, he gets (t1 − c) in period
1. When monitoring occurs, he is taken to be a good type and thus will also
get t2 in period 2, in which he will then shirk, so that he will not again incur
any cost of effort in that period. On the other hand, when choosing S, he
gets t1 in period 1 (thus saving on effort costs c), but with probability q he
is found to be shirking and fired, so his expected payoff for period 2 is only
(1− q)t2. It follows that S is preferred iff
t1 − c+ t2 < t1 + (1− q)t2 ⇔ c > qt2 (6)
so that the optimal decision of a bad type as a function of q and c is given
by
aB∗1 (q, c) =
{
S if c > qt2
E otherwise
(7)
(i.e. shirking occurs whenever effort costs are sufficiently high). This means
that for q ≥ q := 1
t2
, all bad types choose E independent of their cost
parameter c. The threshold q relates the benefit from employment in period
10









2 (t2) to the maximum cost of effort during probation, which is equal to 1.
Clearly, when t2 is relatively large, then q is low, which means that shirking
in period 1 is undesirable for a bad agent given the prize at stake. Thus, even
a relatively low level of q would induce all bad agents to exert effort as long as
q is set greater or equal than q. In this case, shirking would no longer occur
on the equilibrium path, so there would be no information transmission in
equilibrium and β∗E = α would hold. However, as will be shown below, it is
indeed optimal for the principal to choose some q < q so that both possible
actions, E and S, occur with positive probability on the equilibrium path,
so there is no leeway in forming off-equilibrium beliefs. Finally, note that
the principal’s beliefs conditional on M are consistent with the equilibrium
strategies of both types.
2.2.4 The principal’s optimal choice of q
The optimal choice of q at stage 1, under the assumption that the equilibrium
continuation as derived in Lemma 1 is played subsequently remains to be
determined. Clearly, the principal’s objective is to maximize her expected
payoff. Let us analyze each part of it in turn.
Good Types: In period 1, there are α ·N good types; none of them shirks
in equilibrium, and therefore none of them is fired. Since for simplicity we
assumed a negligible output during probation, they yield a negative payoff
(−t1) to the principal, but the important point is that this payoff is indepen-
dent of the monitoring probability q. In period 2, there is again no shirking,
and each of the α ·N good types yields the principal (v2 − t2) > 0, which is
again independent of q. This means that the choice of q neither influences
the number of good types in each period nor their choice of effort. Therefore,
in what follows, we can neglect the payoff accruing from good types as it will
11









have no effect on the optimal level of q.
Bad Types: Recall that a bad type will shirk in period 1 whenever c > qt2.
Thus, from the principal’s point of view, the probabilities of shirking and
exerting effort are given by, respectively,
s(q) := Pr(c > qt2) = max(0, 1−H(qt2)), (8)
e(q) := Pr(c ≤ qt2) = min(H(qt2), 1). (9)
Clearly we have ds
dq
≤ 0, and de
dq
≥ 0 and s′(q) = −e′(q).
Since there are (1 − α) · N bad types, the expected payoff generated by
them in period 1 is:
pi1(q) := (1− α) ·N · (e(q) · (−t1) + s(q) · (−t1))
= (1− α) ·N · (−t1) (10)
because e(q) + s(q) ≡ 1. Note that this term is also independent of q. This
highlights the fact that in period 1 the principal monitors workers not so much
because she is interested in their output, which in this period is negligible,
but mainly because she needs to detect bad workers.
In other words, from the principal’s point of view, monitoring in period
1 matters only because it influences the number of bad types in period 2.
Precisely for this reason q must be set in a way that induces some shirking in
period 1; otherwise no bad type would be detectable. Formally, the number
of bad types in period 2 is determined as follows. Each bad type shirks with
probability s(q) but is detected only with probability q so that (1− α) ·N ·
(1− q) · s(q) bad types remain in period 2. Moreover, each bad type exerts
effort with probability e(q) and is thus not identified through monitoring, so
another (1− α) ·N · e(q) of them survive the probation period. Taking this
together, since each bad types generates a payoff of (−t2) to the principal,
12









her expected payoff from the bad types in period 2 is given by
pi2(q) := (1− α) ·N · ((1− q) · s(q) + e(q)) · (−t2) ∀q ∈ (0, q). (11)
We can therefore state the following result concerning the optimal monitoring
frequency q∗.
Proposition 1. Given the equilibrium continuation characterized in Lemma
1, the optimal monitoring frequency for the principal induces shirking on the
equilibrium path (i.e. 0 < q∗ < q := 1
t2
).
Note first that q∗ < q implies that the equilibrium continuation as deter-
mined in Lemma 1 also applies.
Intuitively when q is too low, only a few bad agents are identified while
when q is too high, each bad agent is less likely to shirk in period 1 and
thus cannot be identified through monitoring either. As bad types shirk
with probability 1 in period 2 (yielding a negative payoff −t2 < 0), too much
monitoring is not in the principal’s interest. Note that again this argument
does not rely on monitoring costs, which are assumed to be zero, since with
positive monitoring costs, the optimal monitoring rate would be even lower.
2.3 Comparative statics: Potential gains from moni-
toring optimally
We now analyze the potential magnitude of the gain induced by setting q
optimally instead of monitoring “too often”. For this purpose, we perform
a comparative statics analysis w.r.t. the distribution of effort costs and con-
sider distribution functions of the class H(c) = cn where n ≥ 1. The case
n = 1 is then just the uniform distribution, and by increasing n, the function
becomes more convex, and there is more probability mass on high realizations
of effort costs.
13









With H(c) = cn it then follows from Eqn. (9) that a bad agent exerts
effort during probation with probability e(q) = qntn2 for all q < q so that
from Eqn. (11) the objective function of the principal can be written as
max
q
pi2(q) = (1− α) ·N · (1− q + qn+1tn2 ) · (−t2). (12)
Therefore the FOC is qntn2 (n + 1) − 1 = 0 and the optimal monitoring rate









This leads to the following result.
Proposition 2. The optimal monitoring rate q∗(n, t2) is strictly increasing
in n satisfying limn→∞ q∗(n, t2) = 1t2 (= q).
Intuitively, when more and more probability mass is shifted towards high
realizations of effort costs, more shirking takes place during probation, mak-
ing monitoring more effective at the margin. Note, however, that for any
finite n, the optimal monitoring rate is bounded from above by q ≤ 1 such
that it is never optimal for the principal to monitor with probability 1. In
the limit, when virtually all mass is on the highest realization c = 1, if the
monitoring rate were q ≥ q, all bad agents would prefer to exert effort so
that the principal would not learn anything at all. However, just slightly
reducing the monitoring rate below q would induce shirking with probability
1 so that the principal would learn a lot.
Using these results, we now show that, for n large, reducing q just slightly
below q will also make a big difference to the principal in terms of profit. As
a benchmark, we take the case where monitoring is excessive (q ≥ q), which,
in terms of profits for the principal, is also equivalent to the case q = 0. In
both cases, she does not detect any of the bad agents, so her expected payoff
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from these bad agents in period 2 is a pure loss equal to
pi2(q = 0) = pi2(q ≥ q) = (1− α) ·N · (−t2) < 0. (14)
On the other hand, when q∗ is chosen instead, the probability that a bad
type remains in period 2 is strictly less than 1 and given by 1− q∗ ·s(q∗) < 1.
Thus, the principal is able to filter out at least some of the bad types so that
the loss caused by the remaining bad agents is
pi2(q = q
∗) = (1− α) ·N · (1− q∗ · s(q∗)) · (−t2). (15)
By taking the difference between (15) and (14), her absolute gain from choos-
ing the optimal “interior” monitoring rate q∗ compared to monitoring exces-
sively at some q ≥ q is:
∆pi := pi2(q = q
∗)− pi2(q ≥ q)
= (1− α) ·N · (−q∗ · s(q∗)) · (−t2) > 0, (16)
which can be usefully expressed in percentage terms as
∆pi% :=
∆pi
|pi2(q = 0)| = q
∗ · s(q∗). (17)
With H(c) = cn and q∗(n, t2) as determined in Eqn. (13), this leads to the
following result.
Proposition 3. The percentage gain for the principal from monitoring op-
timally is strictly increasing in n satisfying limn→∞∆pi% = 1t2 (= q).
When high realizations of effort costs become more likely, bad agents
prefer to shirk more often for a given monitoring rate. We have seen in
Proposition 2 that in this case, the principal prefers higher monitoring rates
so that, while always remaining positive, the “distance” between q and q∗
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decreases. As Proposition 3 shows, while the difference q−q∗(n) is decreasing
in n, the gain for the principal from choosing q∗ instead of q is increasing in n
(i.e. there is a lot to be gained for the principal by not monitoring too much
when there is a lot of probability mass on high realizations of effort costs). In
the limit, when n becomes very large, the difference between q and q∗ becomes
arbitrarily small, but the gain for the principal is maximum: at q = q−, the
principal induces shirking with probability 1, so that monitoring is highly
effective, while at q = q, all bad agents exert effort so that monitoring is
useless. Thus, as high realizations of effort costs become more likely, reducing
the monitoring rate just by “an ” might have a strong effect on profits, and
this effect is maximum when t2 is small. It is in such situations where we
would expect probation periods to be particularly useful for the principal.
For the extreme case where, in addition to n → ∞, also t2 → 1, it can be
shown that the principal would detect all bad agents with probability one.
3 Discussion
In the setting described above, monitoring during probation serves as a
screening device that increases profits inasmuch as it allows the principal
to identify and fire shirkers before this becomes too costly or even impos-
sible. This is, however, not the only mechanism through which monitoring
may affect profits. In this section we briefly discuss alternative mechanisms,
contrasting them with the one identified by our paper.
3.1 Effect of monitoring on productivity during the
monitoring period
One immediate modification of the basic model allows for a non-zero output
in the probation period. In the simplified setting of section 2, monitoring has
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no effect on productivity during probation simply because, by assumption,
work done by agents in this period has no value for the principal.
It is straightforward to show that if v1 > 0 instead, our argument survives
as long as v1 is not too large. From Eqn. (10), the expected payoff of the
principal for period 1 becomes
pi1(q) = (1− α) ·N · (e(q) · (v1 − t1) + s(q) · (−t1)), (18)
which is increasing in q, since e′(q) > 0. Clearly, while increasing the optimal
monitoring intensity, as long as output during the probation period is not
too important to the principal, the effect we emphasize remains.
More subtle is instead the contrast with the results by Cowen and Glazer
(1996) and Dubey and Wu (2001) who show that less monitoring might
induce agents to exert more effort during the monitoring period such that
a principal benefits from having a “less accurate picture” about an agent’s
behavior.
In the first paper, an agent trying to exceed a given threshold, such as
passing an exam, might exert more effort when he is monitored with low
frequency only. For example, the principal announces that there will not be
an exam question on each topic covered in class. The reason is that with fewer
questions, the risk of failing is higher when the student has not studied the
whole material. In the second paper, the principal wants to induce maximum
effort by all agents. Agents have different skills and are monitored at random.
The agent with the highest observed output receives a prize. To give the low
ability agents incentives to exert effort also, the principal has an interest in
keeping the sample of observations small (i.e. to monitor less often) since
large samples would tend to favor high ability agents as they are more likely
to produce a high output.
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Both papers are static in the sense that a low monitoring rate in a given
period might induce more effort and is therefore beneficial for a principal
in this period. In contrast, our argument is dynamic in emphasizing the
potential benefits from not monitoring extensively in early periods, inducing
more shirking in these periods but serving as a screening device from which
the principal benefits in later periods of a relationship.
3.2 Effect of monitoring on productivity in future pe-
riods
We now consider further channels through which monitoring in early periods
may affect the principal’s future payoff and that are therefore potentially
countervailing the selection mechanism we are emphasizing in this paper.
In particular, we consider the case where monitoring has a positive effect
on an agent’s future productivity. For example, monitoring during probation
might trigger a learning/training process or the formation of “good habits”,
both of which may increase permanently the baseline productivity of all
agents including the potential shirkers. In this case, the trade-off between
the advantages and disadvantages of monitoring in the first period shifts in
favor of increasing monitoring and against the claim of our paper.
Consider the simplest case where the productivity of a shirking agent
in period 2 is given by vS2 (q) = a · q where a ∈ (0, t2) measures the effect
of monitoring in period 1 on an agent’s productivity in period 2, so that
our basic model with a = 0 emerges as the limiting case.13 The payoff of
the principal from a shirking agent in period 2 is then simply vS2 (q) − t2 =
a · q − t2 < 0, and thus the upper bound a = t2 ensures that this payoff is
still negative for all q ∈ [0, 1]; otherwise the selection motive vanishes and
13The productivity of a non-shirking agents is still v2.
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the principal never wants to fire an agent after probation.
To make our points as clearly as possible, and to get closed-form solutions,
we consider the case where H(·) is uniform and where t2 = 1 so that q∗ = 12
and q = 1 in the basic model (see Eqn. (13)). Then, the objective function
for the principal becomes:
max
q
pi2(q) = (1− α) ·N · (1− q + q2) · (aq − 1). (19)
An interior solution will satisfy the first order condition and is given by
q∗∗(a) =
1 + a−√1− a− 2a2
3a
, (20)
which is strictly increasing in a in the relevant range. This leads to the
following result.
Proposition 4. As long as the beneficial effect of monitoring during proba-
tion on the productivity of shirking agents in period 2 is not too strong, the
principal optimally still induces shirking on the equilibrium path. Formally,
the optimal monitoring intensity is given by q∗∗(a) for all a ∈ (0, a) and q = 1
otherwise, where q∗∗(a) = q.
Note first that lima→0 q∗∗(a) = 12 = q
∗, and thus our result from the basic
model emerges as a limit case. Moreover, because of the additional beneficial
effect of monitoring, q∗∗(a) is strictly increasing in a and thus higher than
in the basic model. However, q∗∗(a) is only consistent with the equilibrium
continuation of Lemma 1 when below q (i.e. as long as a < a); otherwise,
there is no more shirking on the equilibrium path.
When a ≥ a, full monitoring (q = 1) is optimal. In contrast to the
basic model, the principal is not indifferent between q = 0 and all q ∈ [q, 1];
although none of the bad agents are filtered out for each of these monitoring
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levels, the principal strictly prefers q = 1 because of the higher productivity
of (shirking) agents.
Thus, whenever the optimal monitoring intensity is given by q∗∗(a), the
optimal monitoring intensity tends to be higher compared to the basic model,
but it is again not excessive in the sense that it does not prevent shirking
overall since the selection motive still matters to the principal.
At a more general level, which purpose of monitoring prevails in a given
context clearly depends on whether the heterogeneity of types tends to be
exogenous and persistent, in which case screening becomes the main objective
for the principal (as in our framework), or whether the principal can somehow
influence the degree of heterogeneity over time such that learning or habit
formation become more relevant. In our view, nothing seems to suggest that
the screening purpose of monitoring should in principle be less relevant to
the principal than these alternative purposes.
3.3 Endogenous pool of agents ex ante
A further potentially beneficial ffect of a high monitoring frequency is sug-
gested by Wang and Weiss (1998) who show that the prospect of being mon-
itored intensively can deter potential shirkers workers from applying for the
job.14
Note first that in our model the parameter α (i.e. the fraction of good
types in the agent pool) can be interpreted as a proxy for the usefulness of the
screening process of applicants. Obviously, from Eqn. (11), the principal’s
equilibrium payoff is increasing in α.
Moreover it is also straightforward to extend our basic model to allow
14In their model, the productivity of agents is exogenous. The issue of mimicking, which
is crucial in our framework, does therefore not arise.
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for an endogenous pool of agents: Assume that, prior to the effort choice,
an agent can also choose whether or not to accept the job at all or quit, in
which case she gets her reservation payoff W .
From the incentive condition (6), an agent prefers to shirk in period 1 if
c > c˜ := qt2. In this case his payoff along the equilibrium path is t1+(1−q)t2,
and thus he will not quit in the first place as long as his outside option W is
sufficiently small. Define the critical level W˜ such that an agent with effort
cost c > c˜ is indifferent between quitting and shirking by
W˜ = t1 + (1− q)t2. (21)
He will thus prefer to quit for allW > W˜ , and since d
dq
W˜ = −t2 < 0, a higher
monitoring intensity tends to induce more agents with high effort costs (who
would otherwise shirk) to refrain from working for the principal.
Therefore, as in section 3.2, the consideration of the mechanism consid-
ered by Wang and Weiss shifts the tradeoff in favor of more monitoring with
respect to what implied by the basic version of our model. However, note that
even in this case, our intuition would still apply inasmuch as some residual
heterogeneity in the propensity to shirk remains in the pool of hired agents.15
Moreover, in a world in which both mechanisms coexist, it is also in-
teresting to consider their interaction. In this case, the principal’s ex ante
commitment to excessive monitoring during probation to deter bad appli-
cants may be time-inconsistent when the screening process is not perfect and
the firm hires bad workers in equilibrium. The principal would still have
an obvious incentive to reduce monitoring during probation, as suggested by
our paper, in order to identify the remaining bad agents before the relevant
productive activity starts. This reasoning leads to the preliminary conclu-
15Wang and Weiss confine attention to the two-type case such that, in equilibrium, only
agents with high productivity apply for the job.
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sion that workers should be sceptical about a principal’s announcement of
excessive monitoring when it is clear that if the principal maintained the com-
mitment, she would not learn anything about the potential shirkers possibly
still present among workers under probation.
3.4 Crowding-out of intrinsic motivation
Thus far we have maintained the assumption that only bad types react to
the monitoring intensity, while the behavior of the good and intrinsically
motivated types remains unaffected. This is in contrast to a large recent
literature on the interaction of psychological and economic incentives arguing
that the latter might crowd-out intrinsic motivation.16
The underlying rationale for such dysfunctional responses is that explicit
incentives may convert a human relationship into a purely economic one,
and that this may reduce intrinsic motivation and behavior based on fair-
ness. More concretely, it has been argued that economic incentives, in par-
ticular small ones, might simply insult individuals, and this may give rise to
a non-monotonic relationship between economic incentives and performance
(Gneezy and Rustichini 2000b and Gneezy 2004). Moreover, economic in-
centives might provide new information concerning the importance or cost
of an individual’s activity (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a and Benabou and
Tirole 2003). Finally, economic incentives might not be in accordance with
social norms of cooperation, fairness or trust (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003,
Fehr and List 2004 and Sliwka 2007).
With respect to the intensity of supervisors’ control in human relation-
ships, Frey (1993) and Falk and Kosfeld (2006) suggest that individuals might
16See for example the seminal contributions by Deci (1971) and Titmuss (1970) in psy-
chology and economics, respectively; for surveys see also Frey and Jegen (2001) and Gneezy
(2004).
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perceive control as a signal of distrust to which they respond with low effort.
In such situations, a principal might benefit from foregoing the possibility to
control agents too intensely.
In terms of our model, when such motives are present, then the behavior
of the good types, which are intrinsically motivated, could be negatively
affected by the monitoring intensity, while we have assumed that they are
indifferent to monitoring. Clearly, in such an augmented framework, there
would then be two reasons for principals not to monitor excessively: Not
only would it induce bad types to make themselves non-identifiable during
probation (as pointed out in our paper), but it might also reduce the intrinsic
motivation to exert effort of the good types. In the light of these arguments,
our result could then be interpreted such that excessive monitoring is not
optimal for a principal even if crowding-out of intrinsic motivation is not a
concern. When it is, then the optimal monitoring intensity would tend to be
even lower.
4 Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that monitoring a partner too much in the ini-
tial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine her
loyalty to the match and if the cost of terminating the relationship increases
over time. If too much monitoring induces the partner to behave well even
if her inclination in the absence of monitoring would be to mis-behave, the
principal does not learn what needs to be learned at the beginning of a re-
lationship. Note that this mechanism is completely independent of the costs
of monitoring, and thus the result holds even if monitoring is costless. This
general intuition applies to many social relationships characterized by asym-
metric information with respect to the types of agents such as for example,
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labor and marriage contracts.
Furthermore, we show that the use of probation periods, together with
some monitoring during such periods, is beneficial to the principal when
agents’ the cost of exerting effort during probation tends to be high compared
to the benefit of future interaction. In this case, bad agents give in to the
temptation of shirking more frequently during probation, so that monitoring
is an effective tool in filtering out these agents provided that it is not too
frequent. On the contrary, when the costs of effort tends to be low, our model
suggests that probation would be a waste of time as a method to detect bad
agents through monitoring.
Our streamlined framework allows us to derive our basic result in its
purest form at the cost of some simplifications. Apart from the further po-
tential impacts of monitoring already discussed in section 3, we have also
maintained the assumption that the principal cannot use incentive schemes
to screen workers or elicit effort from bad types. Clearly such schemes would
be costly for the principal because of informational rents, which will tend to
be the higher, the larger the het rogeneity of types. Moreover, the screening
process can often not be expected to work perfectly, possibly due to institu-
tional constraints such as in the case frequently encountered in reality where
workers in same job must also get the same (fixed) wage. This is the case we
consider, but our results do not qualitatively depend on it; as long as some
heterogeneity of types remains after some incentive structure has been imple-
mented, the principal would still have an incentive to use also her monitoring
policy as a screening device as stressed in our paper. After all, the fact that
probation periods exist in many long-term relationships of different natures
hints at the difficulty of relying solely on incentive contracts as a screening
device. Monitoring during probation (but not too much) is therefore needed
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A Proof of Proposition 1
We proceed along the following lines: since the objective function of the
principal is continuous in the interval [0, q),
i) we show that the expected payoff of the principal is strictly increasing at
q = 0 and strictly decreasing as q → q, and
ii) we show that the absolute expected profit level is also higher at q = q∗
than at q = 0 and when q approaches q (the payoff function of the principal
is flat for all q ≥ q).
To do this, define
Z(q) := [(1− q)s(q) + e(q)](−t2) = [(1− q)(1− e(q)) + e(q)](−t2)
= [(1− q + qe(q)](−t2) (22)
where
Z ′(q) = [−1 + e(q) + qe′(q)](−t2). (23)
Recall that the expected payoff from the good agents and from the bad
agents in period 1, respectively, is independent of q. Furthermore, from (11),
pi2(q) = (1− α) ·N · Z(q) so that q∗ is uniquely determined by Z(q).
ad i): We need to show that Z ′(q = 0) > 0 and Z ′(q → 1
t2
) < 0:
Z ′(q = 0) = t2 > 0,
Z ′(q → 1
t2




) + 1] = −e′( 1
t2
) < 0.





Z(q∗) = (1− e(q∗) + q∗ · e(q∗))(−t2),
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Z(q∗)− Z(0) > 0⇔
(1− e(q∗) + q∗ · e(q∗))(−t2) > (−t2)⇔
e(q∗) < 1,
which is true for all q∗ < q. Thus, the principal’s payoff is strictly higher
when an interior level of q is chosen.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Taking the derivative of q∗(n, t2) with respect to n yields
d
dn
q∗ = − 1
(n+ 1)n2
{n+ (n+ 1)(n ln t2 + ln 1
tn2 (n+ 1)
)} (24)
so that it has to be shown that the term in curly brackets is negative. We
proceed in two steps:
Step 1: We first show X(n, t2) := (n ln t + ln
1
tn(n+1)
) < 0 for all n ≥ 1 and
t2 > 1. Note first that X(n, 1) = ln
1
1+n
< 0 for all n > 0. Furthermore, we
have d
dt2



















Step 2: It has to be shown that Y (n) := n + (n + 1)X(n) < 0. Taking the







which is negative for all n > 0. It follows that Y (n) is maximum at n = 0
and that Y (0) = 0 so that Y (n) < 0 for all n ≥ 0.
27









C Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that with H(c) = cn, we have e∗(q, n, t2) = qntn2 . Inserting q
∗(n, t2)
from Eqn. (13) yields e∗(n) = 1
n+1
and thus s∗(n) = 1− e∗(n) = n
n+1
. It then











Taking the derivative of (27) w.r.t n yields
− 1
(n+ 1)








where the first and the third term are clearly positive so that we have to
show that the second term is negative. Notice that this amounts to verifying
that n ln t2 + ln
1
tn2 (n+1)
= X(n) < 0, which was shown to hold in the proof of
Proposition 2.











D Proof of Proposition 4






1− a− 2a2 − 2 + a
−6a2√1− a− 2a2 , (29)
Clearly, the denominator is negative, but the numerator is also negative
in the relevant range: First note that it is equal to zero at a = 0. Moreover,





1− a− 2a2 − 2 + a = −1− 4a+
√
1− a− 2a2 < 0, (30)
which holds since the inequality holds for a = 0 and since the last two terms
are also strictly decreasing in a.
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Finally note that, because q∗∗(1
2
) = 1 = q, the relevant range is 0 < a < 1
2
so that a = 1
2
in our case and that also
√
1− a− 2a2 > 0 holds for all
a ∈ (0, 1
2
).
It remains to show that, for a < a, the principal’s equilibrium profit is
also higher when choosing monitoring intensity q∗∗(a) rather than q = 1.
From Eqn. (19), when monitoring at rate q∗∗(a), the principal’s payoff s
pi2(q = q
∗) =
(5a2 − 2a+ 2 + (a− 2)√1− a− 2a2) · (−2 + a−√1− a− 2a2)
27a2
.
When monitoring with q = 1, the principal gets
pi2(q = 1) = (1− α) ·N · (a− 1) < 0.
Taking the difference pi2(q = q
∗)− pi2(q = 1) yields
12a2 − 20a3 + 3a− 2− (4a2 + 2a− a)√1− a− 2a2)
27a2
, (31)
which is positive for all a < a = 1
2
. Hence, the optimal monitoring policy is
given by q∗∗(a) for a < a = 1
2
and by q = 1 for a ≥ a.
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